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PROF. ADELMAN: It’s time to get to work. We are standing between everyone 
and drinks, so we will move along. 
We have in our book a description of the players up here, but you see some differ-
ent faces.  
Dimitrios, who has been doing the twenty-five-minutes perfectly for the past 15 
years or so, is in trial. There was only one person who could possibly substitute. He’s next 
to me now. But whether he can achieve the precision and finish exactly in twenty-four 
minutes and fifty-nine seconds has yet to be determined. 
Then we have Kevin Collins, who is substituting for George Pappas. I don’t know 
that George Pappas has ever been on our panel, so I guess he’s not substituting for him. 
MR. COLLINS: He told me he was. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Kevin is from Covington & Burling. 
Down there is Matt Siegal. He has been around forever on this panel. 
Tryn Stimart is with Gibbons. He’s new. 
Nick Groombridge has been around forever. Everybody knows him. He’s from 
Paul Weiss. He keeps half the firm busy and half the revenue. He’s spending a little bit of 
time with us, but he’s unbelievable. 
Then we have Josh Sarnoff. His job is to fight me; whatever I say, he’ll disagree 
with. He’s at DePaul, writes a lot, well-known. 
That’s our group. 
Now the program. In twenty-four minutes and fifty-nine seconds John will present 
U.S. developments. We’ll have some discussion, and then Kevin will talk about Halo,1 a 
case designed to increase attorney fees to support the legal profession and slap the Federal 
Circuit for trying to make rules so people will know what the law is. That’s really not what 
the Supreme Court likes; they like to stretch it so they have more power and lawyers make 
more money. He’ll tell us about that. 
With all that, John, are you ready? 
MR. RICHARDS: I’m about as ready as I’m ever likely to be, so I guess I should 
get started. Thank you, Marty. 
We have had four Supreme Court cases since this time last year, which I think most 
people know something about, but I will go over them very quickly. 
 Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy2: People were musing as to whether 
the Supreme Court might say that inter partes review and post-grant review proceedings 
were unconstitutional because they could result in the taking of property by the PTAB, 
which is not an Article III court. People were saying that if you went back and looked at 
what the law was in England at the time of U.S. independence, only the courts could do 
that, the Privy Council had lost its right to do that, and that was part of the Executive as 
opposed to the courts. 
The Supreme Court said: No. We look at the post-grant inter partes review pro-
ceedings as basically something where the Patent Office is correcting itself. We’ve already 
said that the grant of a franchise can be subject to administrative review; therefore, that’s 
it; the Patent Office can correct its mistakes by review. We are not going to worry about 
whether an Article III court should be required, at least on the basis of the way in which 
the case has been pleaded — which left open the possibility that if the case had been 
pleaded in some other way — for example as a takings issue, rather than whether it should 
be an Article III court — the inter partes review proceedings, etc., would have been found 
to be unconstitutional. 
 
1 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
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That issue was raised in Advanced Audio Devices v. HTC,3 and a petition to the 
Supreme Court was filed in that case to see whether the Supreme Court would in fact take 
it up. It did not. So I think these proceedings are probably now safe. 
The second Supreme Court proceeding, decided on the same day, was S.A.S. Insti-
tute v. Iancu.4 That has been discussed already in this Conference in the context of the 
PTAB proceedings. 
Basically, the PTAB Rules as laid down by the Patent Office permitted the PTAB 
when instituting a review to decide that it was only going to look at some of the claims that 
were being challenged and not all of them. The problem with that was that 35 U.S.C. 318 
says “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the 
[Board] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent 
claim challenged by the petitioner. ...” 
Basically, the argument was that if a claim has been challenged, the PTAB has to 
make a decision on it. The Supreme Court says: Yes, we are going to interpret the statutory 
language as written — which is pretty common for the Supreme Court these days — not 
look at the policy issues; therefore, once you have a PTAB review instituted, then all claims 
that were in the challenge have got to be considered and there has to be a final decision 
on that. 
Judge Newman, who unfortunately cannot be here, had been arguing for some time 
before that decision that the way in which the PTAB and the Patent Office were addressing 
only some of the claims was raising issues having regard to what is estopped. You’ll recall 
that anything which could reasonably have been raised in these reviews was estopped from 
being used later in court or International Trade Commission (ITC) proceedings. 
What has happened since the S.A.S. decision is, of course, now anything that has 
been raised in a challenge, or could reasonably have been raised in a challenge, is being 
regarded as estoppel from raising that issue in subsequent proceedings. Some people have 
said that has put a damper on challenges. I’m not sure. There are others who are more 
involved in this on a day-to-day basis on this panel than I am, so I will leave that to them. 
The other issue is that the time limits that are imposed on many pending cases had 
to be extended in order to allow for consideration of all of the grounds that are challenged 
rather than just those on which the PTAB had initially decided to institute a proceeding. 
Just as a corollary to that, the estoppel issue that the Federal Circuit had previously 
decided, that no review could be instituted on a claim which was challenged, meant that 
you were not estopped with respect to that. Now, of course, you are. 
The next Supreme Court case chronologically is WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geo-
physical Corporation5. This was a case where there was export from the United States of a 
component that was then incorporated overseas into a product that had it been produced in 
the United States would have infringed. It is basically the 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) situation, 
what I think of as the overseas contributory infringement provision. 
The Federal Circuit had said: Yes, there is infringement under that provision; but 
no, we are not going to grant damages with respect to the consequences of that infringe-
ment overseas. The patent laws are territorial, so therefore we don’t feel that we can do 
that. 
The Supreme Court said: Nope, you’ve got it wrong. 35 U.S.C. § 284 basically 
says that the court shall award damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, and 
that there was no reason why one should exclude damages that occurred outside the United 
 
3 Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. HTC Corp., 139 S. Ct. 334 (2018). 
4 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
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States when making that assessment as to what the total damage resulting from the 
infringement was. The question was whether there was an “act of infringement” within the 
United States; if there was, then any damage flowing from that is compensable. 
Justice Gorsuch dissented on that, raising the question of whether this might result 
in other countries now starting to award damages against acts taking place in the United 
States if it could be said that it was a possible infringement of their laws which would cause 
that damage to flow into the United States. 
I’m not so certain that many other countries actually have a provision correspond-
ing to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2), so that may be something that we are concerned about without 
having need to worry too much. 
That decision basically reopened the 2013 Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semi-
conductor International6 case, which is still sort of lumbering its way through the courts, 
where the act of infringement was a sale in the United States, but damages resulted outside 
the United States from that sale. So we are not just now talking about the situation in which 
there was export and Section 271(f); we are going to a 271(a) situation, basic direct 
infringement. 
The Federal Circuit has agreed to reconsider its decision that damages occurring 
abroad could not be compensated in that case. So there could be an opening up now to 
floodgates of case law addressing the question of when damage arising outside the United 
States deriving from an act of infringement inside the United States can lead to compensa-
tion. 
In the final Supreme Court decision this period, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.,7 the Supreme Court went in — an unusual decision for the 
Supreme Court — and actually put policy ahead of the literal wording of the statute. 
When the America Invents Act was passed, the definition of what constituted prior 
art was changed and the underlined wording was added at that point: “A person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless — The claimed invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication or in public use or on sale or otherwise available to the public, before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention.” The question was whether that additional 
language affected the meaning of what went before. 
Case law prior to the America Invents Act had made it clear that if you put some-
thing on sale before the critical date, you did not necessarily have to disclose what the 
invention was in order for that to be relevant prior art. And, the argument was, that as a 
matter of grammar, once you added “or otherwise available to the public,” that affected 
what went before it; in particular, whether it now had to be that the thing that was put on 
sale prior to the critical date made the invention available to the public. 
The Supreme Court says: No, there was not an intention to change the law, or at 
least we don’t believe that Congress intended to change the law. It had been the law since 
1829 that once you put the product on the market you had — in 1829 you didn’t have any 
time to file your patent application; then in 1839 it went to two years to file a patent appli-
cation; in 1939 it went to one year to file your patent application — but that was it; once 
you’d done that and you missed that date, then that was prior art against you. The Supreme 
Court basically says: We don’t see any reason why just the addition of a few words in an 
act of Congress should change what had been established law since the 1830s.  
 
6 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 





Verbatim Transceedings, Inc. 714/960-4577 
5 
There are other cases that the Supreme Court has actually decided. We’ve got two 
cases where Certiorari has already been granted. Neither of them is particularly dramatic 
in terms of where we are going with substantive patent law. 
In Return Mail Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service,8 the issue is whether the U.S. Postal 
Service is a “person” entitled to bring a challenge under the covered business method 
review provision of the America Invents Act that provides that in order to be able to bring 
a proceeding under the covered business method challenge provisions, you must have been 
charged with infringement. The U.S. government, which runs the U.S. Postal Service, is 
entitled to use any patent subject to a personal claim for compensation. Does that constitute 
“infringement” under the terms of the statute; and is the U.S. government in fact a “person” 
under the terms of the statute? 
The Federal Circuit said: Yes, it is a “person” and a charge that you’ve got to pay 
compensation is equivalent to a charge of infringement; therefore, enough to enable the 
Postal Service to bring the challenge. 
The Supreme Court has accepted this case and will look at it. 
The second case that is definitely before the Supreme Court is Iancu v. NantKwest.9 
This relates specifically to the question of whether the Patent Office can obtain attorney 
fees if, instead of appealing a decision against you in the PTAB in examination proceed-
ings, you take the case to the district court in an action against the Patent Office for the 
grant of a patent. 
The statute says that, irrespective of whether you win or lose under those circum-
stances, the Patent Office is entitled to recover its “expenses” from the person who insti-
tuted the case. The Federal Circuit said that “expenses” do not include the cost of the Patent 
Office attorneys who ran the case. That has gone to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme 
Court will address the question as to whether under those circumstances attorney fees can 
be awarded. 
There are five cases where the Supreme Court has requested the advice of the So-
licitor General on whether to grant Certiorari. In order for Certiorari to be granted, four 
Justices have to say the case is worth looking at. They have asked for assistance from the 
government on this. 
RPX Corporation v. ChanBond LLC10 arises from case law of the Federal Circuit 
on the question of what rights a challenger has if it loses in inter partes review or post-grant 
review? 
The statute says that the losing party can appeal to the Federal Circuit. The Federal 
Circuit has said: Well, it’s not as simple as that. We are an Article III court. The Constitu-
tion limits our power to deal with cases and controversies. If the challenger is not in a 
situation where it has a case or controversy against the patent owner but is simply trying 
to clear up the patent portfolio, get rid of bad patents, then it has no standing to come to 
the Federal Circuit on appeal. 
It is going to be interesting to see what the Supreme Court does. The statute clearly 
says the party has the right to appeal, but you may not have a case or controversy such that 
it meets the Article III requirement. 
In Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, 
Inc.,11 the Court has asked the Solicitor General to opine on the fairly consistent practice at 
 
8 868 F. 3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
9 Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1292 (2019). 
10 RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, No. 17–2346, ECF 39 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2018). 
11 Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304 
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the Federal Circuit for a number of years, going back to Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
Drilling v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc12 a few years ago, that when the statute says that 
it is an act of infringement to put a product on sale, the final sale resulting from that putting 
on sale must be in the United States. Again watch this space, but it could be that again 
we’ve got an aspect of extraterritoriality creeping in.  
Another case where the Solicitor General’s opinion has been requested is Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc.,13 which is a case where there has been the practice in 
Federal Circuit decisions for a while that if you have a disclosure in a provisional applica-
tion that resulted in a published patent, then the disclosure of that provisional application 
can only be treated as prior art against a later application if there is a valid claim to priority 
going back to that original provisional application. 
The Federal Circuit basically said: There can only be such a valid claim to priority 
if what was described in the original provisional application finishes up as being claimed 
subject matter in the final published document. This seems a little counterintuitive, and we 
will see whether the Supreme Court does in fact agree to take that case. 
There are two other two cases in which the Solicitor General’s opinion has been 
requested. 
HP Inc. v. Berkheimer14 has caused a change of practice in the Patent Office. The  
decision in this case was that although issues of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
are matters of law, there can be a factual underpinning that needs to be addressed particu-
larly when you are looking to see whether what is being claimed is an obvious, conven-
tional, etc. application of the judicial exception.  
The practical effect is that the examiners have now been told that when they want 
to rely on the second step of the Alice/Mayo test, they have to set out why they believe it 
is conventional, etc.; they cannot just assert that. 
Second, in terms of litigation, it has meant that there can now be delays. You can-
not necessarily rely on a district court to give a quick opinion that the patent is lacking 
eligibility because there is now the possibility of factual issues coming up, and factual 
issues cannot be dealt with in summary judgment. So that has had a practical effect. 
The other case where the Solicitor General’s opinion has been requested is Vanda 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Inc.,15 in which the 
Federal Circuit held that a claim to a medical method of treatment based on a diagnostic 
activity was patent-eligible. 
Chief Judge Prost dissented, saying that this was contrary to what was set out in 
Mayo. The case really highlights the internal contradictions in Prometheus v. Mayo,16 
where the Supreme Court said: Natural laws are not eligible for patent protection, but of 
course we don’t intend to bar patents for specific applications of those natural laws, such 
as methods of treatment.  
But the problem is once you have done the diagnostics, then probably the rest of 
what you are doing, or at least in many cases the rest of what you are doing, could be a 
conventional application. 
We will see how the Supreme Court deals with that. 
I will skip the other cases where petitions for certiorari have been raised. 
 
12 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 
F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
13 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018). 
14 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
15 Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int'l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 





Verbatim Transceedings, Inc. 714/960-4577 
7 
The question of Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services17 was touched 
on this morning. It came down earlier this year, on approximately the same date as Andrei 
Iancu’s new guidance came out as to how to deal with the question of judicial exceptions 
under Section 101. It basically divided Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test into two parts, the 
second prong being to see whether there was a practical application of the natural law, etc. 
Judge Newman’s dissent basically set out reasoning exactly along the same lines 
as the guidance. The majority of the Federal Circuit, however, said she was wrong because 
this was contrary to what the Supreme Court had done in Prometheus v. Mayo. 
So we’re going to see. This case really does put into context the question of 
whether the guidance issued by the Patent Office will in fact have real impact going for-
ward. 
There has been a group of cases under Section 102 that have basically clarified to 
some extent what the law is with respect to situations in which there have been disclosures 
to a group of people who are interested in the topic but there may not necessarily have been 
a permanent record of it. 
In GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding,18 it was found that disclosure at a trade-only 
show was sufficient to constitute a printed publication. 
The other one that I think is interesting is Barry v. Medtronic,19 where a surgeon 
had carried out a method that finished up being part of the patent claim. He had charged 
patients for doing that and he had done three such surgeries before the critical date. He had 
evaluated two of them before the critical date; the third one he hadn’t. 
The Federal Circuit said: No anticipation. It is still either an experimental use until 
he has done the third evaluation; or the invention was not ready for patenting until he had 
done the third evaluation. I found that a little surprising. 
There are other slides in the slide deck that are available on the Conference web-
site.  
I will mention very briefly two design cases, which typically do not feature in our 
annual review.  
The first is In re Maatita20 in which the Federal Circuit held that a claim to a shoe 
bottom that showed a lot of stuff in dotted lines, which had been rejected by the Patent 
Office as not showing the depth of various indentations or protrusions on the shoe bottom, 
failed the written description of enablement and definiteness requirements of Section 112. 
    The Federal Circuit said: No; you can see where the indentations and the 
protrusions are; it’s addressed with a two-dimensional design; that is all that is needed. 
Had you claimed the shoe itself, then maybe you should have shown the depth of the 
indentations and protrusions. 
The final case is Advantek Marketing v. Shanghai Walk-Long Tools.21 This is one 
where you actually have to see the picture in order to understand what the issue is about. 
    The application that had been filed had these two embodiments, one with a roof 
and the other without a roof. There had been a restriction requirement. They opted for the 
one without the roof. The alleged infringement had the roof. The argument was that it was 
prosecution history estoppel because you had given up the one with the roof.    
 
17 Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
18 GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
19 Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 914 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
20 900 F.3d 1369 127 USPQ2d 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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 The Federal Circuit said: Nope, there is infringement because what you have 
includes the structural framework of the bottom which is all that’s required. 
One final note is in the area of protection for plants. The Plant Patent Act has been 
regarded as being the method for obtaining protection for asexually reproduced plants, 
whereas the Plant Variety Protection Act as the way for obtaining protection for plants 
reproduced by seeds. 
That Plant Variety Protection Act was amended last December to now cover asex-
ually reproduced plants as well, which might make the ability to obtain real protection for 
asexually reproduced plants easier because the Plant Patent Act basically has fallen into 
disuse in recent years as the result of certain cases which have construed the statute in a 
narrow way. 
Sorry I overshot, but I’m done. 
PROF. ADELMAN: That’s okay. You’re done. 
PROF. SARNOFF: It was the substantial equivalent of the time. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.  
PROF. ADELMAN: I always push the question of how much damage the Supreme 
Court does. We heard, of course, about the Court of Justice in the last program. But I think 
our Supreme Court is special in making a mess. 
The first question is: I haven’t seen, and nobody has given me, a computer-related 
case involving Section 101 where they say, “There was clearly an invention and it should 
have gotten a patent”; they start with something abstract, “that’s obvious”; and then they 
say, “If you do obvious things to something, that’s obvious.” Maybe we can come up with 
one. So think. 
But with respect to biotech, now we all agree that there are inventions that should 
be patented, that the rest of the world patents, and because our Supreme Court is either 
technically ignorant, anti-patent, or they don’t give a damn, we have a problem. That’s 
number one. We have had some discussion already, so I don’t know how much we want to 
beat on that. 
I then want to turn to Helsinn, which I think is the dumbest case of all — and that 
is difficult — where the United States goes from a first-to-invent system, which has all 
kinds of policy arguments, to a first-to-file system. 
Now, everywhere in the world secret prior art in first-to-file systems is not prior 
art. Maybe in the first-to-invent system it would make some sense — I might argue about 
that — but at least that’s possible.  
I don’t see how there is any sense in what the Supreme Court said, that we go back 
to 1829, the beginning of the first-to-invent system. So maybe you want people to get to 
the Patent Office quickly and you need some incentive, and maybe you even say, “Well, 
let’s make the incentive ‘even if it’s secret’” — although that wasn’t the law in 1829 — 
but you can understand that, because otherwise there is no incentive to go to the Patent 
Office. But in a first-to-file system there is tremendous incentive to go to the Patent Office. 
In fact, some people argue it pushes people to the Patent Office too quickly. 
So the Supreme Court is just plainly wrong. The Supreme Court is supposed to be 
textual. Let me read the statue: “The claimed invention was patented or described in a 
printed publication or in public use or on sale or otherwise available to the public.” Cer-
tainly that implies we adopted the standard of the rest of the world. 
“No,” says the Supreme Court, “you know that you read public use as secret use.” 
Do you know that public use is a secret use in case law going back to 1948? “Public use 
means secret use?” If somebody read “Public use means secret use,” they’d say, “You’re 
crazy!” 
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PROF. ADELMAN: Of the inventor’s secret uses, yes. But it doesn’t mean secret 
use by a third party. This is crazy! There’s no other way around it.  
So I throw that open. What’s wrong with this Court? They can’t even get a simple 
case right! 
MR. SIEGAL: Even a broken clock is right twice a day, and this time they got it 
exactly right. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Again you’re wrong. Why? 
MR. SIEGAL: I don’t know where to begin.  
I can start with statutory construction. You are saying that the words — patented, 
printed publication, public use, sale — are all superfluous; all it should say is “available to 
the public.” 
The fact that we have gone to first-to-file does not mean that we have necessarily 
adopted every law of certain countries in Europe. Our on-sale law has always been about 
not extending the patent monopoly by letting you start economically benefitting while you 
keep your invention secret with confidentiality agreements, protections, disclosures, or 
whatever, and then wait two or three or four years before you file your application. 
PROF. ADELMAN: That is insane in the modern world! I mean that is insane. 
That is such a stretch of common sense. If you have a first-to-file —— 
MR. SIEGAL: Are you saying it is not secret prior art? Your big complaint about 
secret prior art is that it is really not secret? 
MR. RICHARDS: It should not be prior art, period. In the old system, first-to-
invent, I could keep something secret and get trade secret protection. 
MR. SIEGAL: But you couldn’t put it on sale. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Listen, I could file in the Patent Office right away and stall 
for years, like the Selden patent was in the Patent Office for twenty years. This idea that it 
encourages early filing isn’t even true. It only became true in 1995 and we’ve had the law 
far before that. Under the old law you could file and sit on the application. Selden filed on 
an automobile in, I think, 1883, and every two years he filed some paper because he figured 
that later there would be an automobile industry and it would be bigger than it was then. It 
issued in 1901. Then he sued Henry Ford. I could give you all kinds of examples of things 
that stayed in the Patent Office for years. In fact, we developed an estoppel theory based 
on that. 
So certainly there was this incentive to file. It just doesn’t hold water.  
And the policies are totally different. I disagree with my dear friend John. 
MR. SIEGAL: How do you really feel? 
PROF. ADELMAN: John thinks there was policy. I think there were no brain cells. 
I mean they should put something on the bottom of their opinion: “No neurons were used 
in this opinion.” This is terrible! [Laughter] 
PROF. SARNOFF: I totally agree with everything Marty said. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I knew he would. 
PROF. SARNOFF: NOT. [Laughter] 
It is another example of why legislative drafting shouldn’t be left to lawyers and 
judging shouldn’t be left to judges, because we don’t have clear standards for interpretation 
and we don’t have clear standards for how to construe revisions to language. 
All of this could have been easily avoided by moving “otherwise publicly availa-
ble” to the front rather than the back so that you didn’t have to choose the rule of the last 
antecedent but rather the series modifier method of interpretation.  
This is why we have a problem, because the Supreme Court refuses to say how we 





Verbatim Transceedings, Inc. 714/960-4577 
10 
PROF. ADELMAN: No. This is just to trick foreigners into destroying their 
patents because they read English.  
I had a Chinese student who said, “I’m trying to learn English and you’re telling 
me that public use means secret use. How can I learn English?” 
But at least allegedly there was a policy. I mean Learned Hand was wrong in 1946. 
MR. SARNOFF: So again, the Supreme Court would have had to say, notwith-
standing the traditional rules that they have applied in lots of other statutory interpretation 
contexts, that unless the legislation is perfectly clear, the prior interpretations are carried 
forward, and because the rule of the last antecedent applies — you know, Congress have 
made this clear. They didn’t. That’s the problem. Your complaint is not with the Supreme 
Court; it is with the legislative drafters. That’s the problem. If they do it clearly, you don’t 
have these issues, Marty. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I can just see it now.  
MR. SIEGAL: Put “otherwise publicly available” at the front of the sentence. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I’m a legislator and I ask somebody, “Read this. Everybody 
in the world, I’m told, doesn’t have secret prior art for good reasons. Is there a way you 
can twist this language so ‘secret prior art’ isn’t in there?” 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Marty, I know you are fired up about this, but what dif-
ference will it make? 
PROF. ADELMAN: We will invalidate. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Will it make any difference at all? 
PROF. ADELMAN: We will invalidate patents for the unsuspecting, particularly 
the Europeans. The good part about this is this requires professors to go around the world 
and explain to people that we have silly laws. 
PROF. SARNOFF: I’m available, Marty. 
MR. RICHARDS: Marty, the Europeans, as you’ve just pointed out, have this as 
their law anyway, so they are not going to come here relying on your interpretation of the 
statute because they have already had to deal with this at home. 
PROF. ADELMAN: No they haven’t. Their secret uses, their secret sales, would 
not be considered prior art. It’s just the opposite. They would be fooled. It’s wonderful; 
you will have all kinds of business because of this. 
Okay, enough of this, unless somebody else wants to chime in. I’ve ranted too 
long. The Supreme Court is a very rich target for ranting. 
PROF. SARNOFF: The two examples that John gave of the printed publication (or 
not) are actually better examples of what the statutory language was meant to cover, which 
were oral disclosures. They should have just said, “These are available to the public” and 
that would have resolved both cases. But that’s a different issue. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Does anybody have one case where a computer-related 
invention that should be patented that Section 101 precludes from patenting, an example? 
Maybe there are none. I’ve always thought there were none, but nobody has ever told me 
that. 
So this is totally unimportant; the Alice case means nothing. What matters, I assert, 
is Mayo. And it goes back to 1948 — it is not new — to Funk Brothers, 22 the first case 
with this irrational doctrine. 
The interesting thing that I think has been raised in this conference, particularly by 
former Chief Judge Michel, is: would it really work to have a legislative fix in this area? I 
mean nobody in the world does what we are doing because if you read our opinions, nobody 
would take them seriously. Would that work? 
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MR. RICHARDS: What has happened in other countries where they have 
attempted to do this is that the courts have finished up by having to construe the statute 
even more bizarrely than the Supreme Court does here in order to meet the needs of indus-
try. So I’m skeptical, frankly. 
MR. SIEGAL: I think either Director Iancu or Judge Michel said that we have 
fixed this legislatively, that in Funk Brothers where they were talking about invention, we 
have now separated that out into Sections 112, 102, and 103; that if you just read the case 
carefully, you would understand that, even though they’re using the word “invention,” they 
were talking about obviousness. That is his point. 
PROF. ADELMAN: But that’s not relevant. 
MR. SIEGAL: That’s seeds under a bridge. 
But at his point do we really need Congress to come in and do something because 
it’s a disaster?  
Judge Frankfurter in Funk Brothers said, “Every invention involves a law of nature 
or a natural phenomenon.”23 And when you say, “Well, if you’ve got a natural phenomenon 
have you added some inventive concept to it?” that is going to fail 100 percent of the time 
because when you write a patent you do not claim something inventive and then add more 
to it. Therefore, if the “something extra” was patentable, that would be your whole patent; 
you would stop right there. 
If I discover that a particular drug cures a particular disease, that only works 
because of a natural phenomenon. Applying the drug to someone who has the disease, 
that’s obvious; we know how to give people pills or injections or infusions.  
The natural result is that every method of treatment is invalid. We really need to 
fix this. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I think in 1948, in spite of the attempt to distinguish it, the 
Supreme Court has never done that. In fact, Mr. Justice Douglas, the brightest man on the 
Court — I don’t think he ever got anything right; he gives intelligence a bad name — and 
there were dissents. In that case, neurons did function, but in modern cases very rarely. 
Any other comments on whether legislation would help? I read the legislation and 
I can just hear Mr. Justice Breyer say, “Ooh, that’s the same.” 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Right. It is not clear that the legislative fixes would really 
make things clearer. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Yes. Can you address that? 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: I’m not sure that I want to. I certainly have views about 
that. 
PROF. ADELMAN: What do you want me to say? I’ll do it for you. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Vanda24 is my case. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I know. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: So I’m not that anxious to express a lot of views about 
this. But I do think that it is probably unhealthy that we have come to a situation where 
diagnostic methods, many would say, are effectively ineligible in the United States. There 
could be policy reasons why we want to have different measures of protection for diagnos-
tics — the level of investment required is a lot lower than to develop a new therapeutic — 
but right now what we’ve got is a rule that just seems to be arbitrary. 
PROF. SARNOFF: I filed an amicus in Vanda. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: On the other side, the wrong side. [Laughter] 
 
23 See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
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PROF. SARNOFF: The only thing I want to add, because I just can’t let Marty say 
something that’s not right — 
PROF. ADELMAN: Josh and I are always arguing. I know I’m right when he takes 
the other position. 
PROF. SARNOFF: The 1948 Funk Brothers case wasn’t the first example of 
inventive application. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Yes it was. 
PROF. SARNOFF: Further, if you read the Application of Ducci25 case, P.J. 
Federico, the other co-author of the 1952 Patent Act, successfully argued for the Patent 
Office in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that the definition of “process” in the 
1952 Act incorporated a “non-analogous use standard,” which is essentially the same as 
the “markedly different” standard, that is the same standard that we are applying in the 
Myriad context and it is the same basic principle of inventive application. So it has been 
there for a while. It has been the interpretation of the 1952 Act since 1955, according to 
the courts of appeals. This isn’t the Supreme Court now just coming to it. 
PROF. ADELMAN: No. I said 1948. 
PROF. SARNOFF: O’Reilly26 also is an inventive application case, as are so many 
— Ansonia Brass is an inventive application case. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Oh come on. 
PROF. SARNOFF: But let me move on. 
One comment that was made in an earlier panel was that we can push this all into 
Section 103 law by just taking the categorically ineligible discovery and not having that 
contribute to technical effect. Although that is true and it would get us closer to what the 
European system looks like, there is a big difference.  
That difference is, at least the way the courts are applying the 101 law based on 
the language of Flook,27 which again goes back to language from O’Reilly, which  improp-
erly understood the Neilson28 case, is that you treat the discovery as if it is prior art against 
the applicant. That is precisely why you need a different inventive concept than just prac-
tical application of the discovery. 
The important point to make is that the reason that we do that is because otherwise 
if the discovery itself shouldn’t be eligible, any practical application that’s narrow just 
allows you to claim the public domain of that discovery in piecemeal fashion. I can file 
70,000 narrow claims, and now I essentially own the discovery that I am not supposed to 
claim outright. That is the reason that we do inventive application. 
PROF. ADELMAN: That’s very inventive. 
PROF. SARNOFF: I also wrote about it in all three briefs.  
PROF. ADELMAN: I know you did. 
PROF. SARNOFF: So it’s not new. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I know you did. It’s absolutely wrong. Nobody implies that. 
You start with whatever is scientific discovery.  
The first case where the prior art was not what we call prior art but was a discovery 
of a natural phenomenon that you will find is 1948 in Funk Brothers. 
PROF. SARNOFF: In the Supreme Court. But you have Morton v. Eye Infirmary29 
and lots of other earlier cases. 
 
25 Application of Ducci, 225 F.2d 683 (C.C.P.A. 1955). 
26 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 63, 14 L. Ed. 601 (1853). 
27 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2523, 57 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1978). 
28 Neilson v. Harford, Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841). 
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PROF. ADELMAN: That was not a Supreme Court case. They were arguing about 
what Flook meant. I’m talking about Mr. Justice Douglas, the anti-patent Supreme Court 
Justice, and he never got anything right, including that opinion, and did a lot of damage 
because Breyer learned from that. 
Now another what I would claim is not a major mistake, it’s a minor mistake, 
because it helps out attorneys and gives us more fees, is our willfulness law after Halo. 
Arguably it is pro-patent.  
Kevin, do you want to spend a few minutes on that? 
MR. COLLINS: Sure. Thanks, Professor. 
The precursor, as the U.S. practitioners who engage in willful infringement analy-
sis know, was Seagate. In 2016 the Supreme Court reversed various parts of Seagate, find-
ing that the two-pronged standard that they had set up was too onerous, specifically the 
objective recklessness requirement. What was going on was defendants were coming up 
with defenses during the litigation that they had no reason to come up with prior to the time 
of infringement, and that, frankly, made obtaining willful infringement very, very difficult. 
In 2016 in the Halo case the Supreme Court again reversed the Federal Circuit and 
eliminated the objective recklessness requirement. Basically, the Court said that future 
courts in terms of evaluating willful infringement should focus on the actions that the 
accused infringer took at the time of the accused infringement, not just actions and posi-
tions taken during litigation, therefore breathing life back into willful infringement. 
That then brought up opinions of counsel. After In re Seagate,30 the use of opinions 
of counsel became much less important, given the objective recklessness requirement. That 
has now brought back the use of opinions of counsel. This raises issues of privilege and 
waiver and whether defendants should seek opinions of counsel in response to allegations 
of infringement. This causes strategy concerns and issues for trial; waiver; whether you 
need separate opinion counsel. 
Prior to Seagate, it used to create all kinds of issues for trial counsel and for inhouse 
counsel: Do we need an opinion? Is the opinion of counsel going to be separate? Are we 
going to disclose the opinion? 
Those have now been resurrected as a result of Halo. But we are also in the world 
of IPRs now, so I’ll raise the question to the practitioners — Nick, Tryn, and Matthew — 
whether you all have seen the rise of opinions of counsel since Halo. 
MR. STIMART: I have. In fact, I’ve had several clients ask, “What should we do?” 
I said, “When you get a sense that you are going to be accused of infringement, go out and 
get yourself an opinion of counsel.” We have actually used that strategically in a litigation 
where we disclosed the opinion, we made it very narrow, subject to waiver, and it effec-
tively scared off the other side. They didn’t expect it. They tried to challenge us. 
I have counseled in some instances the other way, but I think, on balance, I have 
recommended more that they go back now and get something early on in writing from an 
outside firm that is very tight, very narrow on the issue that they are concerned about, and 
hold that, and we’ll see how we are going to use it. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: I would say we have seen a resurgence in getting opin-
ions. That has become more common. It’s my view that they are probably more important 
for indirect infringement than they are for willfulness as a practical matter. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Has it increased attorney fees? I mean let’s get down to 
basics. 
 
30 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo Elecs., 
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MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Well, somewhat, but the cost of getting an opinion is a 
tiny fraction of the cost of having a lawsuit. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Yes. So maybe it doesn’t matter. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: I throw out to you, Marty, just to chew on — or Josh or 
anyone else — why doesn’t Section 298 refer to contributory infringement? You don’t 
have to answer it. You can just tell me over drinks. 
PROF. SARNOFF: Poor legislative drafting. 
MR. SIEGAL: I think, as Nicholas said, the cost of an opinion is so small compared 
to the cost of litigation.  
And not only that, in my experience you can look at a patent, you can look at prior 
art, and you can come to some conclusions relatively quickly, but until you write them 
down, until you make claim charts, until you really start finding each and every limitation 
and where there is support, and where for a particular issue you might need some expert to 
say “it would be obvious to combine these” or “here is what this particular thing means” 
— writing that opinion and being very rigorous about it is going to flesh out the claim 
interpretation issues and it is going to help you figure out who you need to provide the 
evidence for those claim interpretations.  
I’ve always counseled that getting an opinion is one of the most valuable things 
you can get. 
PROF. ADELMAN: But that doesn’t answer the question. This discretion — the 
Federal Circuit was solidly slapped because it had the audacity to set out a set of rules. The 
Supreme Court didn’t say, The rules are bad; we just don’t like rules. My impression is 
that if you don’t have rules that builds up attorney fees. My question is, is that happening? 
MR. SIEGAL: In this case, I think it has actually reduced attorney fees. It used to 
be you needed that opinion and you were beholden to your attorney. 
PROF. ADELMAN: After Seagate? 
MR. SIEGAL: Prior to. 
PROF. ADELMAN: But Seagate was overturned. 
MR. SIEGAL: Right, so this is a return. You now have a little more basis to say, 
“You should really get an opinion.” 
PROF. SARNOFF: Let me ask a question, though. After Commil31 distinguished 
that you can still induce even if you believe the patent’s invalid, are the opinion letters that 
are being obtained limited to the issue of noninfringing conduct and not addressing inva-
lidity, or is there still value to getting the invalidity judgment so that you don’t get willful-
ness on a direct infringement basis going forward from the time that you got the opinion? 
MR. SIEGAL: I think any good litigator can figure out a way to make an invalidity 
opinion a noninfringement opinion and use that as a “get out of jail free” card for your 
inducement issue. I think that whole issue is really kind of a disaster waiting to happen. 
You could come up with a pretty good procedure for never infringing a patent in that area, 
which sort of avoids answering that question. 
PROF. ADELMAN: Audience questions to anybody on the panel? 
QUESTION [Judge Hans van Walderveen, District Court The Hague, The Hague]: 
An interesting difference between the U.S. patent system and our system in Europe is that 
your system is much more emotional. I like that. 
PROF. SARNOFF: We are also the only system that would be stupid enough to do 
design protection in patent law. The Maatita32 case and the other case that you saw just go 
 
31 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (2015). 
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to show that that is even more messed up than utility law. Designs are always understood 
as a whole. The concept of partial design shouldn’t exist in patent law. But enough said. 
MR. RICHARDS: One practical consequence of what has been going on in design 
law is we are now seeing an increasing number of rejections from the Patent Office of 
design patents on the ground of obviousness, and nobody’s got a clue what is meant by an 
obvious design. 
PROF. SARNOFF: Exactly. 
PROF. ADELMAN: And now we find out that our system is better because it’s 
emotional, and we have juries because we otherwise wouldn’t have a Constitution if we 
didn’t have juries. 
Another question? 
QUESTION: Jamie Love, Knowledge Ecology International.  
PROF. ADELMAN: Oh my God! Jamie, we’ve got to have a drink. One question. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Love]: Are you familiar with CAR-T treatment?  
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: I am. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Love]: It’s a treatment for cancer where they draw your 
blood, isolate your T cells, modify the T cells with a virus, multiply the modified cells, and 
reinject them back into your body. To us that looks like a procedure. In U.S. patent law, 
like in many countries, there is a limitation on the ability to enforce a patent for medical 
procedures. I’m just wondering what elements of CAR-T treatment do you think are pro-
tected from enforcement of patents by this provision on surgical and medical procedures 
and which parts do you think are not protected by that exception? 
PROF. ADELMAN: Anybody want to take that on? Nick? 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: I think it gets into a set of issues around where you draw 
the line between a method of treatment and a procedure, which is going to exceed the 
amount of time that we have by a long way. 
PROF. SARNOFF: The only other thing I’ll say is that there are also provisions of 
that section that do not apply to contributory infringement. 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Correct. 
PROF. SARNOFF: But they do apply to inducement. Further, you can still sue the 
patient even if you can’t sue the doctor. It’s just poorly drafted to begin with. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Love]: You can sue the patient for being treated? 
PROF. SARNOFF: Yes, you sue the patient for the infringement, or for inducing 
the infringement by the person who does the CAR-T cells treatment. Yes, you can do it. 
This is really poorly drafted. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Love]: Has that ever happened? Has anyone ever sued the 
patient in those circumstances? 
MR. GROOMBRIDGE: Not that I know of. Again, you’re going to sue for the 
patient inducing the doctor. You sue the patient as a means of trying to shut down the 
practice. 
PROF. ADELMAN: I don’t know that any patient has ever been sued anywhere in 
the world. But we have a statute. 
It’s time to have some drinks. I want to thank the panel. I especially want to thank 
John for stepping in and trying his best. He was over time, but next year he’ll be better. 
